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Ranking development programs using integrals of discounted utilities can yield dras-
tic consequences that oﬀend our sense of justice. New alternative social welfare criteria
should be considered. A reaction to discounted utilitarianism is to moderate its ef-
fects by adding to the social welfare function a second term that takes seriously the
welfare of the generations that live in the far distant future. Chichilnisky proposes a
social welfare function that has two desirable properties: (i) non-dictatorship of the
present, and (ii) non-dictatorship of the future. However, in many economic models,
there exists no optimal path under the Chichilnisky criterion. We introduce a third
desideratum: “non-dictatorship of the least advantaged,” and propose a new welfare
criterion that is morally compelling. It is a weighted average of two terms: (a) the sum
of discounted utilities, and (b) the utility level of the least advantaged generation. We
derive necessary conditions to characterize growth paths that satisfy our criterion, and
show that in some models with familiar dynamic speciﬁcations, an optimal path exists
and displays appealing characteristics.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
When performing evaluations of projects that involve future costs and beneﬁts, economists
typically use a positive rate of discount. This procedure is rather non-controversial for
short-term projects, especially those of a marginal nature. However, for long-term projects
that have signiﬁcant implications for future generations, discounting the future is a con-
troversial issue, both at the philosophical level, and at the level of practical implications.
Sidgwick (1907, p. 414) argued against discounting, on the philosophical ground that “the
time at which a man exists cannot aﬀect the value of his happiness from a universal point of
view;...the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his contem-
poraries”1. Perhaps Ramsey (1928) was the ﬁrst economist to have articulated this problem
in an inﬁnite horizon framework. Like Sidgwick, Ramsey considered it unethical to discount
the utilities of future generations. Various utilitarian welfare criteria that avoid discounting
have been proposed. Among these are Ramsey’s “minimum distance from Bliss” criterion,
and the “overtaking criterion” suggested by von Weizsäcker (1965) and Gale (1967)2.A s
pointed out by Chichilnisky (1996), these criteria fail to rank all possible welfare streams,
i.e., they fail the “completeness” test.
The practical implications of ranking time-paths of utilities on the sole basis of comparing the
values of the associated integrals of discounted utilities can be quite drastic. For example, in
the Solow-Dasgupta-Heal model3 with a man-made capital stock and an exhaustible resource,
1Sidgwick’s argument against discounting has led to the “equity principle à la Sidgwick”, which is embod-
ied in the form of the “anonymity” condition: a stream of utility s = {x,y,z,...} should be judged as equal
to a permuted stream sp = {y,x,z,...}. Diamond (1965) shows that if one requires a social welfare function
W(.) to satisfy the strict Paretian property, a weak form of anonymity and some kind of continuity, then
W(.) does not exist. Basu and Mitra (2003) conﬁrm Diamond’s result even without requiring continuity.
Svensson (1980) however shows that if, instead of seeking a (real-valued) function, we merely look for the
ability to rank inﬁnite streams of utilities, then existence of a social welfare relation, or ordering, is ensured.
Unfortunately, Svensson did not oﬀer a constructive proof, so almost nothing is known about such ordering.
2Unaware of the contributions by economists, the philosopher Krister Segerberg (1976, p. 226) poses the
following problem in ethics, in his article titled “A Neglected Family of Aggregation Problems in Ethics”,
published in Noûs (1976):
“Pascal believes that eternity consists of inﬁnitely many days [and] that when his body is dead his soul
will spend each following day in Heaven or Hell...Outcomes can be represented by inﬁnite sequences x0 x1...
xn..., where each xn is either 1(Heaven) or 0 (Hell)....Problems arise when he wants to compare prospects
containing both 1’s and 0’s. Particularly diﬃcult is it to deal with with prospects containing inﬁnitely many
1’s and also inﬁnitely many 0’s.”
3Solow (1974), Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 288-300.)
2while it is feasible to maintain a constant positive level of consumption for ever, utilitarianism
with discounting would prescribe a path with vanishing consumption in the long run, no
matter how small the discount rate is. This consequence oﬀends our sense of justice. It
seems, therefore, that some alternative social welfare criteria shouldb ec o n s i d e r e dw h e nw e
make choices among alternative courses of actions that signiﬁcantly aﬀect future generations.
An extreme form of egalitarianism has been proposed by some philosophers and economists:
the maximin criterion, according to which one stream of utilities is better than another if
and only if the utility level of the least advantaged person in the former is higher than that
of the least advantaged person in the latter. The maximin criterion has also been called
the “Rawlsian criterion” even though Rawls (1971, 1999) had expressed strong reservations
about the use of maximin as a principle for intergenerational equity4. The fascination with
the maximin criterion has spawned a stream of theoretical literature that seeks to charac-
terize development paths that ensure a constant level of consumption, or constant utility,
for all generations. (See, for example, Solow (1974), Hartwick (1977), Dasgupta and Heal
(1979), Asheim (1988), Asheim, Buchholtz and Withagen (2003).) The insistence on con-
stant consumption, however, can yield consequences that are unpalatable. As Rawls (1999,
p.254) pointed out, the unmodiﬁed maximin principle would entail “either no saving at all
or not enough saving to improve social circumstances,” which is totally unacceptable to him,
especially for the case of very poor countries with a low stock of capital5.
Another type of reaction to discounted utilitarianism is to moderate the eﬀects of discounting
by adding to the social welfare function a second term that takes seriously the welfare of
the generations that live in the far distant future. This second term does not contain a
discount rate. This approach was proposed by Chichilnisky (1996), who coined the term
“dictatorship of the present” to describe welfare criteria (such as comparing integrals of
discounted utility streams) that give practically a weight of zero to the utility levels of far-
away generations. She does not object to discounting per se, and does not insist that the
social welfare function must have the anynomity property. To her, as long as the interest
4See Long (2007) for a discussion of Rawls’s reservations, and a review of the related literature.
5See also Rawls (1971, p.291).
3of future generations are adequately protected, in the sense that the social welfare function
does not display “dictatorship of the present”6, some form of discounting is acceptable. She
proposes a social welfare function that has three desirable properties: (i) non-dictatorship of
the present, (ii) non-dictatorship of the future7, and (iii) strong Pareto. The Chichilnisky
social welfare function takes a simple and intuitively appealing form: social welfare is a
weighted sum of two terms, the ﬁrst being the conventional sum of discounted utilities, and
the second term takes on a value which depends only on the limiting behavior8 of the utility
sequence under consideration. The weight given to each term must be strictly positive. It
is interesting to observe that a weighted average of two criteria, one displaying dictatorship
of the present, the other displaying dictatorship of the future, is a criterion that does not
display these undesirable properties.
While Chichilnisky’s social welfare function is well deﬁned and can rank all utility sequences,
in many economic models of interest, there does not exist a utility stream that is optimal
under that criterion9. To illustrate, take the standard Solow neoclassical growth model, and
choose a time path of saving rate to maximize social welfare under the Chichilnisky criterion.
Any path that approaches the golden rule level of capital stock, kg, will maximize the second
term of the weighted sum. It pays therefore to delay the approach to kg as much as possible,
and stay near the modiﬁed golden rule level km as long as possible, because doing so would
increase the value of the ﬁrst term, and would not aﬀect the second term. It follows that
among all paths that approach kg asymptotically, any feasible path is inferior (according to
the Chichilnisky social welfare function) to some other feasible path.
In this paper, we complement Chichilnisky’s non-dictatorship of the present and non-dictatorship
6A social welfare function W(.) is said the display “dictatorship of the present” if for any two sequences
of utilities, say s = {ut} and s0 = {vt},a n dW(.) ranks s higher than s0, there exists some time T>0 such
that no modiﬁcation of the tail-ends (beyond T)o fs and s0 could reverse the ranking. The conventional
utilitarian criterion with discounting implies dictatorship of the present.
7A social welfare function W(.) is said the display “dictatorship of the future” if whenever W(.) ranks
s higher than s0,a l lm o d i ﬁcations of s and s0 that do not aﬀect their limiting behavior would preserve the
original ranking.
8For example, with the utility sequence {ut}the second term could be limsupt→∞ut, or liminft→∞ut,o r
some weighted average of these two limiting values.
9There exists a simple model of non-renewable resource where the Chichilnisky’s criterion does identify
an optimal path. See Chichilnisky (1997), and Figuiere and Tidball (2007).
4of the future by introducing a third desideratum: “non-dictatorship of the least advan-
taged”10, and propose a new welfare criterion which, as we argue below, is morally com-
pelling. Our criterion is a weighted average (with strictly positive weights) of two terms.
The ﬁrst term is the conventional sum of discounted utilities, and the second term is the
utility level of the worse-oﬀ generation. We call this new criterion the Mixed Bentham-Rawls
criterion (MBR). We use the word “Bentham” because our criterion is utilitarian, in the sense
that it permits trade-oﬀs of utilities of diﬀerent individuals, and the word “Rawls” because
of its special (but not exclusive) emphasis on the wellbeing of the least advantaged11.
In the next section, we will present arguments that justify this criterion. In a later section, we
will develop a set of necessary conditions to characterize growth paths that satisfy the MBR
criterion, and show that in some models with familiar dynamic speciﬁcations, an optimal
path under MBR exists and displays appealing characteristics.
2 The mixed Bentham-Rawls criterion
Consider an economy with inﬁnitely many generations. Since we wish to focus on the question
of distributive justice among generations, we make the simplifying assumption that within
each generation, all individuals receive the same income and have the same tastes. Thus, by
assumption, the question of equity within each generation does not arise. This framework
has been used in, for examples, Solow (1974), Hartwick (1977), Dasgupta and Heal (1979,
Chapters 9-10), Dixit et al. (1980), Mitra (1983), and Chichilnisky (1996).
Let ct denote the vector of consumption (of various goods and services) allocated to the
representative individual of generation t.L e t ut ≡ u(ct) be the life-time utility of this
individual (ut is a real number, and u(.) is a real-valued function). We interpret “utility”
as “standard of living”of individuals, rather than some kind of happiness they get when
consuming and/or contemplating their childrens’ and grand-childrens’ life prospects. To ﬁx
ideas, it is convenient to assume that each individual lives for just one period. Consider for
10Rawls’s argument, cited above, against the use of the unmodiﬁed maximum principle, may be considered
as a refusal to accept “dictatorship of the least advantaged”, though he did not use this term.
11In the context of intergenerational equity, Rawls’s emphasis on the least advantaged is not exclusive: if
the least fortunate generation is the ﬁrst generation, he still wants savings to take place (1971, p. 291).
5the moment two alternative projects, denoted by 1 and 2. Project i (where i =1 ,2) yields



















t stands for ut(ci
t).
We assume that while an individual of generation t might care about the consumption vector
of his/her son or daughter, ct+1, and that of his/her12 grand-son or grand-daughter, ct+2,
these vectors have no impact on the “utility” level ut. Thus it might be preferable to refer
to ut as the “standard of living” rather than “utility” of generation t.
For simplicity of notation, we use the symbol ui to denote the utility stream {ui
t}t=1,2,...,.
Roughly speaking, a welfare criterion is a way of ranking all possible utility streams. Let S
be the set of all possible utility streams. A social welfare function, denoted by W(.),i sa
function that maps elements of S to the real number line13.
To simplify matters, we assume that the function u(.) is bounded.
Assumption 1: (Boundedness) Utility is bounded
A ≤ u(c) ≤ B
Remark: The number B is the highest possible level of utility. We shall refer to B as the
“Bliss Utility Level”.
In what follows, we consider only welfare functions W(.) that are non-decreasing in ut.T h a t
is, if the utility level of one generation increases, the social welfare cannot decrease. This is
the well known Paretian property14.
12To avoid repetitive uses of his/her etc., in all that follows, when referring to hypothetical persons, we
use the masculin gender, on the understanding that it embraces the feminin gender.
13This deﬁnition of “social welfare function” is quite common, see, for example, Chichilnisky (1996, p.
240), Basu and Mitra (2003). This is to be distinguished from Arrow’s use of the term “social welfare
function” which is a mapping from the space of all possible individual preference orderings (of social states)
to the space of social orderings.
14The Paretian Property can be strengthened to the “Strict Paretian Property” by replacing the word
“non-decreasing” by “increasing”.
6Property P:(Paretian Property) Welfare is non-decreasing in ut.
Utilitarian social welfare functions permit comparing (and trading-oﬀ)a ni n c r e m e n ti nt h e
utility level of an individual (or group of individuals) with a ‘decrement’ (negative change)
in the utility level of another individual (or group). A familiar example is the “utilitar-
ian criterion with discounting”. Non-utilitarian social welfare functions (such as maximin
and suﬃcientarianism15) admit interpersonal comparison of utility levels, but do not permit
trading oﬀ.
Under the “utilitarian criterion with discounting” (at a positive rate δt > 0), social welfare














(1 + δ1)(1 + δ2)(1 + δ3)
+ ... + ...
According to this criterion, a utility stream uj is ranked higher than a utility stream ui if
and only if Wd(uj) >W d(ui). Thus, a small decrease in the utility level of an individual
(no matter how disadvantaged he already is) can be justiﬁed by some increase in the utility
level of some other individuals.
The Maximin Criterion is denoted by Wm. According to this criterion, a utility stream ui is
ranked higher than utility stream uj if and only if the utility level of the worst oﬀ generation
in stream ui is higher than the utility level of the worst oﬀ generation in stream uj,t h a ti s ,














The utilitarian criterion with discounting has been attacked by many economists, from Ram-
sey (1928) to Chichilnisky (1996). To quote a forceful example from Chichilnisky (1996, page
235):
“...Discounting future utility is generally inconsistent with sustainable development. It can
produce outcomes which seem patently unjust to later generations. Indeed, under any posi-
tive discount rate, the long-run future is deemed irrelevant. For example, at a standard 5%
15For explanations and discussions of the suﬃcientarianism criterion, see Chichilnisky (1977), Frankfurt
(1988), Anderson (1999), Arneson (2002), and Roemer (2003).
7discount rate, the present value of the earth’s aggregate output discounted 200 years from
now, is a few hundred thousand dollars. A simple computation shows that if one tried to
decide how much it is worth investing in preventing the destruction of the earth 200 years
from now, the answer would be no more than one is willing to invest in an apartment.”
Chichilnisky (1996) argues that all utilitarian criteria with discounting place too much em-
phasis on the present. In fact these criteria display insensitivity to the utility of distant
generations. To formalize this idea, let us follow Chichilnisky and deﬁne (Tsi,aT) to be a
utility sequence obtained from si by replacing all elements of si except the ﬁrst T elements
by the tail of the utility sequence a,w h e r e























Consider the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1: (dictatorship of the present; Chichilnisky 1996)
A welfare criterion W(.) is said to display “dictatorship of the present” if the following
condition holds:
For every pair (si,sj), W(si) is greater than W(sj) if and only if, for all T suﬃciently large16,
W(Tsi,aT) >W(Tsj,bT) for all pairs of utility sequences (a,b),w h e r e(Tsi,aT) means that
all elements of si except the ﬁrst T elements are replaced by the tail of the sequence a,a n d
(Tsj,bT) means that all elements of sj except the ﬁrst T elements are replaced by the tail of
the utility sequence b.
In other words, dictatorship of the present means that any modiﬁcation of utility levels
o fg e n e r a t i o n sf a ra w a yi nt h ef u t u r ew o u l dn o tb ea b l et or e v e r s et h ew e l f a r er a n k i n go f
two utility streams. Given Assumption 1, the utilitarian criterion with positive discounting
16More precisely, for all T>b T for some b T that may depend on si and sj.
8displays dictatorship of the present.
A welfare function is said to display “non-dictatorship of the present” if for any pair (si,sj)
such that W(si) >W(sj),t h e r ee x i s t ssome modiﬁcations to utilities of individuals in the
distant future that reverse the ranking.
Let us turn to the other extreme, and consider some welfare criteria that pay no attention
to the utility levels of generations that are living at the present or in the “near future”.
Given a utility sequence {ut}t=1,2,..., ≡ {u1,u 2,...,ut,u t+1,...,...,...}, let us consider the tail
beginning at t, {ut,ut+1,...},a n dd e ﬁne the number zt and yt to be respectively the greatest






The resulting sequence {zt,z t+1,...} is by construction a non-decreasing sequence, and hence





t→∞{ut,u t+1,...} = z
Similarly, the sequence {yt,y t+1,...} is by construction a non-increasing sequence, and hence






{ut,u t+1,...} = y
Clearly, lim inf and lim sup are both well deﬁned social welfare functions. These functions
are entirely insensitive to the utility levels of the generations that are living at the present
or in the “near future”. Welfare comparisons using either of these criteria depend only on
the utility levels of generations born in the distant future. Chichilnisky (1996) pointed out
9that such criteria give a “dictatorial role” to the future. Formally, a welfare criterion W(.)
is said to display “dictatorship of the future” if it has the following property:
Deﬁnition 2: (dictatorship of the future; Chichilnisky 1996)
A welfare criterion W(.) is said to display “dictatorship of the future” if the following con-
dition holds:




T) for all pairs of sequences (a,b),w h e r e(Ta,si
T) means that the ﬁrst
T elements of si a r er e p l a c e db yt h ev e c t o rTa ≡ (a1,a 2,...,aT),a n d(Tb,s
j
T) means that
the ﬁrst T elements of sj are replaced by the vector Tb ≡ (b1,b 2,..,b T).
Both the lim inf and the lim sup social welfare functions display dictatorship of the future.
A welfare function is said to display “non-dictatorship of the future” if for any pair (si,sj)
such that W(si) >W (sj) there exists some modiﬁcations to utilities of individuals in the
early generations that reverse the ranking.
Chichilnisky argued that both dictatorship of the present and dictatorship of the future are
undesirable. She proposed a criterion that rules out both forms of dictatorship.
The welfare function proposed by Chichilnisky17 is a weighted sum of two terms, the ﬁrst
term being the usual discounted stream of utilities, while the second term is deﬁned in a way










where 0 <θ<1, 0 <λ t < 1,
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Here, the limit can be deﬁned to be lim sup, or lim inf, or some weighted average of the
two. The social welfare function WC(.) clearly has the properties of “non-dictatorship of the
17This welfare function has the strict Paretian property, and satisﬁes the axioms of “non-dictatorship of
the present” and “non-dictatorship of the future.” If two more axioms are added, “continuity” and “inde-
pendence” (in the sense of linearity in ut), then this is the only form the welfare function can take.
10present” and “non-dictatorship of the future”.
It is interesting to observe that WC is a weighted average (a convex combination) of two
functions that are themselves based on rejected welfare criteria. The second function, φ(ui)=
limt→∞ ui




dictatorship of the present. A convex combination that gives strictly positive weights to two
“undesirable” welfare functions is free from their associated undesirable properties.
A major problem with the Chilchinisky welfare function WC(.) is that for many growth
models, including the familiar one-sector growth model, there does not exist an optimal
path under this objective function. The intuition behind this non-existence is as follows.
The function φ(ui)=l i m t→∞ ui
t w o u l di n s i s to nr e a c h i n g ,i nt h el o n gr u n ,t h eg o l d e nr u l e




would insist on reaching, instead, the modiﬁed golden rule capital stock. Any path ui that
goes near the modiﬁed golden rule capital stock and eventually veers to the golden rule
capital stock at some time Ti will be beaten by another path uj that does a similar thing
b u ta tal a t e rd a t eTj >T i. The latter path uj in turn will be beaten by another path uh
with Th >T j and so on. So an optimal path does not exist.
We propose to modify the Chichilnisky criterion by discarding the second term, θφ(ui),a n d
replacing it with the maximin utility18. For this purpose, we deﬁne the following concept:
Deﬁnition 3: (dictatorship of the least advantaged)
A welfare criterion W(.) is said to display “dictatorship of the least advantaged” if the
following condition holds:





















18The maximin utility is inf, not lim inf.



















This social welfare function is a weighted average of two functions, one displaying dictatorship
of the present, the other displaying dictatorship of the least advantaged, with a strictly
positive weight given to each19. As a result, it displays “non-dictatorship of the present”
and “non-dictatorship of the least advantaged”. The superscript mbr is an abreviation for
“Mixed Bentham-Rawls”. We use the word “Bentham” because our criterion is utilitarian, in
the sense that it permits trade-oﬀs of utilities of diﬀerent individuals, and the word “Rawls”
because of its special (but not exclusive) emphasis on the wellbeing of the least advantaged20.
Notice that the function Wmbr(.) also implies that the welfare of the present generation
matters, i.e., it displays non-dictatorship of the future. To see this, consider any pair (si,sj)
such that W(si) >W(sj). Then, we can destroy this strict ranking by replacing si
1 with the
lowest possible utility; i.e., modiﬁcations of present utilities do modify the ranking of two
utility streams.
Let us oﬀer a brief justiﬁcation for our proposed social welfare function. Consider a Rawlsian
hypothetical original position, under the assumption that the contracting parties are family
lines21. A family line is at the same time “one” and “many”. Being “one”, it is like a
single individual. There are no valid reasons to object to an individual’s discounting of his
future consumption. But a family line is also “many.” The least advantaged individuals
have special claims like those accorded to the “contemporaneous individuals” of the simpler
atemporal Rawlsian model. It is therefore arguable that each contracting party would (i)
place a special weight on the utility level of the least advantaged generation of the family
line, and (ii) care about the sum of weighted utilities of all generations. It seems also sensible




is not equal to αinf(ui)+β inf(uj). For example, consider ui = {0,1,01,0,1,...} and
uj = {1,0,1,0,1,0,...},w i t hα = β =1 /2.T h e ninf
¡
αui + βuj¢
=1 /2 while inf(ui)=0=i n f ( uj).
20See Rawls (1971, p. 287-291).
21In the context of intergenerational equity, Rawls postulated that the contracting parties represent “family
lines” (1971, p. 292).
12to allow a trade-oﬀ between (i) and (ii) above, because each party represents a family line.
Our proposed mixed Bentham-Rawls criterion is in sharp contrast to the standard utilitarian
tradition (e.g. see any graduate macro-economic textbook) which would treat a family line
as an inﬁnitely-lived individual. Such a textbook position could result in requiring great
sacriﬁces of early generations who are typically poor. In contrast, our proposed approach
avoids imposing very high rates of savings at the earlier stages of accumulation.22
3 Finding the social optimum under the mixed Bentham-Rawls criterion
In this section we derive necessary conditions for an optimal path under the mixed Bentham-
Rawls criterion. It is more convenient to work with a continuous time model. Let x be a
vector of n state variables, and c av e c t o ro fm control variables. Denote the instantaneous
utility function by u(x(t),c(t),t).
The transition equations are ˙ xi(t)=gi(x(t),c(t),t),f o ri =1 ,2,...,n. G i v e nt h ev a l u e so f
the state variables, the control variables at time t must belong to a feasibility set A(x(t),t)
which is characterized by a set of s inequality constraints:
hi(x(t),c(t),t) ≥ 0, i =1 ,2,...,s.
Consider ﬁrst the case of a ﬁnite horizon T. The initial stocks xi(0), i =1 ,2,...,n,a r eg i v e n .
For a given time path b c(.) and the associated time path b x(.),l e tu be the greatest lower
bound of the resulting time path of utility:
u =i n f
t {u(b x(t),b c(t),t)}
This implies that
u(b x(t),b c(t),t) ≥ u
22Rawls also complained about the standard utilitarian approach, as it “may direct us to demand heavy
sacriﬁces of the poorer generations for the sake of greater advantages for the later ones that are far better
oﬀ” (1971, p. 287). He instead advocated that “when people are poor and savings are diﬃcult, a lower rate
of savings should be required; whereas in a wealthier society greater savings may reasonably be expected
since the real burden is less.” (1971, p. 287).
13Assume a constant rate of discount ρ ≥ 0. The social welfare generated by the time path b c(.)




−ρtu(b x(t),b c(t),t)dt + θu (2)
To maximize social welfare given the vector of initial stocks x0 ≡ (x10,x 20,...,xn0),t h e
planner chooses the number u and the time path c(t) to maximize the above welfare function,
subject to
u(x(t),c(t),t) ≥ u (3)
h(x(t),c(t),t) ≥ 0 (4)
˙ x(t)=g(x(t),c(t),t) (5)
and
xi(T) ≥ 0 (6)





y : ∃c(t) ∈ A(x(t),t),u(x(t),c(t),t) ≥ y,






b =s u p{y : y ∈ Z(x0)} (8)
Here b is the highest feasible minimum living standard that can be imposed as a constraint,
given the initial stock x0.
3.1 The necessary conditions
Since u is a constant to be chosen optimally, the optimization problem (2) is an optimal
control problem with u treated as a control parameter. The necessary conditions for such
14problems can be derived from Hestenes’s Theorem23. They are as follows.
Let π(t) be the vector of costate variables, λ(t) be the vector of multipliers associated with
the inequality constraints (4) and ω(t) the multiplier associated with the constraint (3). The
Hamiltonian for this problem is
H(t,x(t),c(t),π(t)) ≡ (1 − θ)e
−ρtu(x(t),c(t),t)+π(t)g(x(t),c(t),t)
and the Lagrangian is
L(t,x(t),c(t),π(t),λ(t),ω(t),u)=H + λ(t)h(x(t),c(t),t))
+ω(t)[u(x(t),c(t),t) − u]
An optimal path must satisfy the following conditions:
(i) The maximum condition: The control variables maximize the Hamiltonian subject to the
inequality constraints (3) and (4),
(ii) The adjoint equations:
˙ π = −
∂L
∂x










dt ≥ 0 ( =0if u <b )
(where b is deﬁned by (8)), and that with respect to the ﬁnal stocks is
x(T) ≥ 0, π(T) ≥ 0, π(T)x(T)=0
23See Leonard and Long (1991, Theorem 7.11.1) for an exposition of Hestenes’ Theorem which deals with
optimal control problems involving control parameters and various constraints.









3.2 Implications for genuine savings
Since one of the fundamental questions concerning intergenerational equity is the “how much
a generation ought to save” given its current circumstances, let us derive the implications
of our mixed Bentham-Rawls criterion for saving rates. Following Hamilton and Hartwick
(2005) and Hamilton and Withagen (2006), let us deﬁne “present-value genuine savings” by
S(t) ≡ π(t)g(x(t),c(t),t)




Then, by deﬁnition of the Hamitonian H and of genuine savings S,
d
dt
H = −ρ(1 − θ)e
−ρtu(t)+( 1− θ)e
−ρt ˙ u + ˙ S (9)
On the other hand,
∂L
∂t
= −ρ(1 − θ)e






Using (v), it follows that along the optimal path, utility is rising at time t if and only if the
rate of change in present-value genuine savings, adjusted for technological progress impact
(the term inside the curly brackets in the equation below), is negative:
˙ S −
©







= −(1 − θ)e
−ρt ˙ u (11)
16i.e.
˙ S +( 1− θ)e
−ρt ˙ u =
©








Thus, the constancy of present-value genuine savings ( ˙ S =0 )is consistent with growing
utility if technological progress impact is positive. In particular, suppose the technological
progress impact is zero. Then, as is clear from (11), if utility is constant over some time











Thus, under our objective function, along the time interval [t1,t 2] when utility is constant,
the current-value genuine savings must be rising:
˙ Sc
Sc = ρ (13)
We will see that this result is conﬁrmed in our numerical simulations below.
Remark: Our result, equation (12), is a generalization of the proposition of Hamilton and
Withagen (2006), and Hamilton and Hartwick (2005). Those papers were concerned only
with the standard utilitarian objective, and thus had no place for the multiplier ω.
3.3 Inﬁnite horizon optimization under the mixed Rawls-Bentham criterion
Suppose the time horizon is inﬁnite and the rate of discount ρ is a positive constant. Then the







17It will be convenient to re-write this objective function as an integral:
Z ∞
0
{θuρ +( 1− θ)u(x,c,t)}e
−ρtdt (14)
Let ψ(t)=eρtπ(t), μ(t)=eρtλ(t) and w(t)=eρtω(t). The current value Hamiltonian of this
inﬁnite horizon problem is
H
c = θuρ +( 1− θ)u(x,c,t)+ψg(x,c,t)
and the current-value Lagrangian is
L
c = H
c + μh(x,c,t)+w[u(x,c,t) − u]
Then we obtain the following conditions:
∂Lc
∂c
=( 1− θ)uc + ψgc + μhc + wuc =0
μ ≥ 0,g(x,c,t) ≥ 0,μg(x,c,t)=0
w ≥ 0,u(x,c,t) − u ≥ 0,w[u(x,c,t) − u]=0












dt ≥ 0 ( =0if u <u H)
where uH is the inﬁnite-horizon counterpart of b in equation (8). Finally, the transversality
conditions with respect to the stocks are
18lim
t→∞e
−ρtψ(t) ≥ 0,a n d lim
t→∞e
−ρtψ(t)x(t)=0 .
4 An Example: Optimal Renewable Resource Use under the MBR Criterion
Let us illustrate the implications of the MBR criterion for a model of renewable resource
exploitation. The resource stock is a scalar x(t). Its growth function is
˙ x = G(x) − c
where G(x) is a strictly concave function which reaches a maximum at some xM > 0.W e
call xM the “maximum sustainable yield” stock level. Assume G(0) = 0 and G0(0) > 0.T h e
variable c denotes the harvest rate.
The utility function is assumed to be dependent on both the stock (which provides amenity
services) and the consumption:
u = u(x,c)
We assume u to be homothetic, strictly quasi-concave and increasing, with ucx ≥ 0, uc(x,0) =
∞ and ux(0,c)=∞. This means the indiﬀerence curves have the usual convex shape in the
space (x,c).




This level is uniquely determined by the following equation, which equalizes the marginal





Clearly, xg >x M,b e c a u s eG0(xg) < 0=G0(xM).






Then, since G(x) is concave,
xu <x g
T h i si sb e c a u s ea sw em o v ea l o n gt h ec u r v ec = G(x) toward greater values of x,t h er a t i o
G(x)/x falls, so the marginal rate of substitution ux(x,G(x))/uc(x,G(x)) falls, and thus
[ux(x,G(x))/uc(x,G(x))] + G0(x) falls, i.e. [ux(x,G(x))/uc(x,G(x))] + G0(x) is a decreasing














Now consider the optimal growth program under the mixed Bentham-Rawls objective func-
tion.






˙ x = G(x) − c
u(x,c) ≥ u
where x(0) = x0 > 0.
An interesting question is: under the MBR criterion, does the optimal path approach a
steady state that is somewhere between the modiﬁed golden rule stock level, xu,a n dt h e
golden rule stock level, xg? Proposition 1 below gives the answer.
Proposition 1: Under the MBR criterion, the steady state depends on whether the initial
stock, x0, is smaller or greater than xρ.
(i) If x0 > xu, the optimal path consists of two phases. Phase I begins at t =0and ends at
some ﬁnite T>0. During Phase I, the utility level and the resource stock are both falling.
Genuine saving is negative and rises toward zero. At time T, the pair (x,c) reaches a mixed
20B e n t h a m - R a w l ss t e a d y - s t a t ep a i r(xmbr,cmbr) where
xu < xmbr <x g
D u r i n gP h a s eI I ,t h es y s t e ms t a y sa tt h em i x e dB e n t h a m - R a w l ss t e a d ys t a t e(xmbr,cmbr).
Genuine saving is constant and equal to zero.
(ii) If x0 < xu, the optimal path consists of two phases. Phase I begins at t =0and ends
at some ﬁnite T>0. During Phase I, utility is constant, which implies a time path of
falling harvest rate, and rising stock. Genuine saving in this phase is positive. In Phase II,
the economy follows the standard utilitarian path approaching asymptotically the utilitarian
steady state given by modiﬁed golden rule stock level, xu. Genuine saving is positive and falls
steadily toward zero.
Proof: Please see the Appendix.
5 Sensitivity Analysis of Optimal Paths under the MBR criterion
5.1 A Renewable Resource Model with Amenity Values
We assume logarithmic preferences, u(c,x)=l nc +l nx,a n dal o g i s t i cs p e c i ﬁcation for the
reproduction function of the resource:







where K is the carrying capacity and r the intrinsic regeneration rate. We follow Brander
and Taylor (1998), setting r =0 .04 and k =1 2 ,000. W es e tt h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e ,
ρ =0 .05, and we assign equal weights to the rawlsian and utilitarian components in our
objective function, so θ =0 .5. Let us use subscripts u,r and mbr to denote the solutions
under the discounted utilitarian, maximin and mixed Bentham-Rawls criteria respectively
and denote steady states by upper-bar variables.
As already pointed out, the dynamic adjustment and the steady state of our economy depend
21crucially on whether the initial resource stock, x0, is below or above the modiﬁed golden rule
stock of resources, ¯ xu. We shall examine both cases in detail.
Figure 1 illustrates the transitional dynamics of an economy that begins with a stock of
resources equal to four times the modiﬁed golden rule stock. The Rawlsian steady state is
given by the golden rule stock of resource, and since the initial stock exceeds this level by
1.5 times we set a time path for Rawlsian consumption, cr (t)=¯ cr, that coincides with the
long-run level of consumption under this criteria. With an initial stock of resource equal
to the carrying capacity, the rate of consumption cr (t) at ¯ cr leads to a negative saving
rate and a falling stock of resource that, in ﬁnite time, reaches the golden rule stock of
resource24. In steady state, rawlsian consumption exceeds the modiﬁed golden rule one by
18.5% guaranteeing that each future generation exactly inherits the golden rule stock of
resources On the other hand the utilitarian dynamics are driven by the trade-oﬀ between the
marginal rate of growth of the resource and the rate of time preference. Since with the stock
close to the carrying capacity its rate of reproduction is negligible this trade-oﬀ is dominated
by impatience and the initial generation enjoys a level of consumption that exceeds by almost
4.5 times the modiﬁed golden rule one. At this level, consumption is substantially larger
than the capacity of regeneration of the resource and therefore the resource stock begins
to fall. The rest of the transition is characterized by subsequent decreases in consumption
and the stock of resource, with genuine savings increasing monotonically towards zero as the
growth rate of the stock increases.
The mixed Bentham-Rawls criterion, which is a compromise between the previous two, leads
to an optimal path with two clearly distinctive phases. During Phase I, that begins at t =0
and ends at some ﬁnite time, tθ > 0, this path follows the unstable dynamics of the utilitarian
solution. The initial level of consumption lies between the rawlsian choice and the utilitarian
one, exceeding the modiﬁed golden rule level of consumption by more than 3.5 times. As
in the utilitarian case, this high level of consumption leads to an initial phase characterized
24Notice that in our model with amenity values, the golden rule stock of resource, which is the stock that
maximizes long-run sustainable utility, exceeds the stock of resource that maximizes long-run sustainable
consumption, i.e. the "maximum sustainable yield."
22by decreases in the resource stock and consumption, with the saving rate monotonically
increasing towards zero. This process of stock depletion continues for 120 generations25,
tθ =1 2 0 .3. At this point in time the mixed Bentham-Rawls solution reaches its steady state
characterized by a stock of resource that exceeds the modiﬁed golden rule stock by 80%
representing around 68% of the Rawlsian steady state stock of resource. Panel (e) reproduces
the evolution of welfare under our three criteria. Since the stock of resource is initially high,
the utilitarian solution yields an initial level of welfare that exceeds the modiﬁed golden rule
level of welfare by 23%. As a result of the high rate of utilitarian consumption the ﬁrst 100
generations are better oﬀ under the utilitarian solution than under any of the other two. On
the other hand the Rawlsian solution yields a path of welfare that falls mildly as the stock
of resources converges to the golden rule stock from above. In the long run Rawlsian welfare
exceeds by 9% that of the utilitarian steady state. The mixed Bentham-Rawls solution takes
advantage of the initial abundance of resources to provide early generations with a level of
welfare that exceeds the rawlsian one by more than 12%, but at the same time uses this
abundance to guarantee all future generations a level of welfare that exceeds the utilitarian
steady state one by 7.5%.
T h el a s tp a n e lo fFigure 1 and the ﬁrst three columns of Table 1 explore the sensitivity of
the optimal adjustment path under the mixed Bentham-Rawls criteria to θ.A st h ew e i g h t
placed in the Rawlsian component of our objective function, θ, increases the mixed Bentham-
Rawls steady-state stock of resource increases towards the Rawlsian one. This reduces the
level of consumption during the initial generations and shortens the length of the transition.
As the initial stock of resources increases, the mixed Bentham-Rawls steady-state stock of
resource increases relative the utilitarian and Rawlsian ones, which still reach the modiﬁed
golden rule and the golden rule stock of resource respectively. The length of the initial
phase of the transition also increases. In a sense the higher initial stock is fairly distributed
across generations, on one hand increasing the number of generations in Phase I and on the
other hand increasing the steady-state levels of consumption and stock to allow all future
25Notice that under our benchmark calibration the speed of convergence exhibited by our model is very
low, with the half-life of a deviation close to 50 generations.
23generations to enjoy higher levels of welfare.
Figure 2 and Table 2 summarize our results when the initial stock of resources is below
the modiﬁed golden rule stock, speciﬁcally in our benchmark calibration we consider the
case when x0 =0 .5 ∗ ¯ xu. The maximin solution chooses a level of consumption below 60%
of the modiﬁed golden rule level of consumption, consistent with a stock of resource that
stays constant and equal to its initial level. The utilitarian solution with its emphasis on
intertemporal trade-oﬀs chooses a level of consumption for the initial generation that is only
43% of the modiﬁed golden rule level. This low level of initial consumption is associated with
substantial increases in the stock of resources. The utilitarian transition is characterized by
a monotonic increase in consumption and the stock of resources and a monotonic decrease in
genuine saving. Our proposed criterion leads to an initial level of consumption close to 50%
of the modiﬁed golden rule level, that allows for a rate of saving above 14%. During Phase I
of the mixed Bentham-Rawls transition consumption falls as the other source of utility, the
stock of resource, accumulates. With consumption falling and the stock of resource increasing
the saving rate increases during this ﬁrst phase of the transition. After 18 generations,
tθ =1 7 .71, the saving rate peaks and Phase II of the transition begins with consumption
growing at a rate that still allows for positive saving and therefore increases in the stock of
resources that monotonically converges to the modiﬁed golden rule stock. As we increase
the weight placed on the rawlsian component of our objective function, θ, the initial level of
consumption, cθ, and the length of Phase I of the transition, tθ, increase. Decreases in the
initial stock of resources lead to simultaneous decreases in the initial level of consumption
and in the length of Phase I of the transition under our proposed criterion.
5.2 A Capital Accumulation Model
We now consider a simple model of economic growth. Assume an economy with a single
capital stock, k(t). The production function, F (k(t)), exhibits positive and diminishing
marginal product in its only argument. Let δ>0 b et h er a t eo fd e p r e c i a t i o na n dc(t) the
level of consumption. The path of the capital stock is given by,
24˙ k = F (k) − c − δk
The utility function is
u = u(c)
which is strictly concave and increasing u0(0) = ∞.
Now consider the optimal growth program under the Mixed Bentham-Rawls objective func-
tion. Assume 0 <θ<1.






˙ k = F (k) − c − δk (16)
u(c) ≥ u
where k(0) = k0 > 0.
We assume logarithmic preferences, ln(c), and a standard Cobb-Douglas production speci-
ﬁcation, F (k)=Akα, with an elasticity of output to capital, α =0 .3, and a constant level
of technology, A =1 .5. In our bechmark calibration we set the rate of time preference,
ρ =0 .05, and the depreciation rate, δ =0 .1. As before we assign equal weights to the rawl-
sian and utilitarian components in our objective function, θ =0 .5,a n dc o n t i n u ew i t ho u r
notational convention.
Figure 3 illustrates the transitional dynamics of an economy that begins with 50% of the
modiﬁed golden rule level of capital. The phase diagram in panel (a) highligths the main
diﬀerences between the three criteria considered. The maximin solution chooses levels of con-
sumption and saving that guarantee that each future generation exactly inherits the intial
capital stock. The utilitarian solution, with its disregard for intergenerational equity, places
all the burden of accumulation on the initial generations leading to a transition character-
ized by increasing capital, consumption and therefore welfare. The mixed Bentham-Rawls
25criterion, which is a compromise between the previous two, leads to an optimal path with
two clearly distinctive phases. Phase I, that reﬂects rawlsian considerations, begins at t0
and ends at some ﬁnite time, tθ > 0. The level of consumption during this phase, cθ, is
constant at some level that lies between the initial utilitarian level of consumption and the
maximin level of consumption, ¯ cr. In Phase II, that reﬂects utilitarian considerations, the
economy increases capital and consumption, approaching asymptotically the modiﬁed golden
rule level of capital, ¯ ku.
Panels (b), (c) and (d) reproduce the time paths of consumption, saving and capital under
our benchmark calibration. The maximin solution chooses an initial level of consumption
close to 90% of the modiﬁed golden rule level. Given the low capital stock, this high level of
consumption is associated with a saving rate of 12% just enough to replace the depreciated
capital. This condemns all future generations to the same initial level of consumption. The
utilitarian adjustment path is driven by the diﬀerence between the marginal product of capi-
tal, the return to saving, and the rate of time preference, the cost of giving up and saving an
additional unit of consumption. With low levels of capital the return to investment exceeds
its cost in terms of utility and therefore the ﬁrst generation enjoys a level of consumption
that is barely 70% of the steady state level of consumption. This low level of consump-
tion is associated with an initial investment rate close to 30% which leads to a transition
characterized by increasing levels of capital. As capital accumulates the incentives to defer
consumption fall and as a result the saving rate monotonically decreases as consumption
increases. The mixed Bentham-Rawls criteria chooses an initial level of consumption that
exceeds its utilitarian counterpart by almost 17%. This level of consumption, although high
by utilitarian standards, allows for a saving rate that exceeds its rawlsian counterpart by
more than 50% and therefore capital begins to accumulate. With consumption constant at
cθ and output growing, the saving rate increases at this early stage of the transition. At the
beginning of the the sixth generation, tθ =5 .1, the capital stock has increased to around
75% of its steady state level and Phase II of the mixed Bentham-Rawls path begins. At this
point consumption begins to grow and the saving rate reaches its maximum. The dynamics
of this phase are purely driven by utilitarian concerns and therefore as capital accumulates
26consumption grows, and saving falls, converging monotonically to the steady states that
coincides with the utilitarian steady state.
Finally the path of welfare mimics the path of consumption. The utilitarian solution requires
large sacriﬁces on early generations, the initial welfare is barely 50% of the modiﬁed golden
rule level of welfare, achieving the constant Rawlsian level of welfare only after 5 generations.
Thereafter utilitarian welfare overtakes its rawlsian counterpart. Our compromise criteria
guarantees a minimum level of welfare for the initial generations and as a result the economy
must wait around 8 generations to reach the Rawlsian level of welfare, overtaking it after
this point. On average the ﬁrst three generations enjoy around 22% more welfare under the
mixed Bentham-Rawls criteria than under the utilitarian solution.
The last panel of Figure 3 compares the level of consumption, cθ, and the number of
generations, tθ, that the mixed Bentham-Rawls solution remains in Phase I for diﬀerent
values of θ.A sw ei n c r e a s eθ the mixed Bentham-Rawls solution converges to the maximin
solution and therefore cθ converges to ¯ cr and Phase I lasts forever. Table 3 explores the
eﬀects of changes in the rate of time preference and the initial stock of capital on the optimal
path of our proposed welfare criteria. Our results are not very sensitive to the rate of time
preference but as the initial stock of capital increases towards the modiﬁed golden rule level
the three welfare criteria converge to the same optimal path and as a result the mixed
Bentham-Rawls criteria chooses initial levels of consumption closer to the rawlsian criteria
lengthening the initial phase of the transition.
Now we turn to the case when the initial capital stock is above the modiﬁed golden rule
stock, especiﬁcally k0 =1 .5∗¯ ku. Figure 4 reproduces the phase diagram and the transitional
path of the relevant economic indicators for our three welfare criteria. Since k0 is below the
golden rule capital stock, the maximin solution chooses a level of consumption, and therefore
a saving rate, consistent with mantaining the capital stock permanently at its initial level.
As a result of the diminishing returns to capital the utilitarian solution initially chooses very
high levels of consumption, exceeding by as much as 29% its steady state level. This high
consumption can only be maintained at the expense of the capital stock, and with a saving
rate below 10% capital begins to fall. As capital falls, so does consumption and output, that
27monotonically converge to the modiﬁed golden rule levels while the saving rate increases
as the marginal product of capital net of depreciation increases towards the rate of time
preference, ρ.
The mixed Bentham-Rawls optimal path consists again of two phases. During Phase I
this solution follows the unstable dynamics of the utilitarian solution. The initial level
of consumption lies between the utilitarian choice and the Rawlsian one, exceeding the
modiﬁed golden rule level of consumption by 28%. As in the utilitarian case, this high level
of consumption leads to an initial phase characterized by decreases in capital, output and
consumption with associated increases in the saving rate. The economy remains in this phase
for almost sixteen generations, tθ =1 5 .9.A tt h i sp o i n tt h em i x e dB e n t h a m - R a w l ss o l u t i o n
reaches its steady state, Phase II, characterized by levels of capital and consumption that
exceed by 5% and 0.5% respectively the modiﬁed golden rule levels asymptotically achieved
by the utilitarian solution. Table 4 explores the eﬀects of changes in θ and k0 in our solutions.
Under the mixed Rawls-Bentham criteria increases in the weigth of the rawlsian component
of the objective function, θ, reduce the initial level of consumption towards the maximin
level, shortening the initial phase of the transition and increasing its steady state level, ¯ cmbr.
Similarly increases in the initial capital stock allow for the Rawls-Bentham criteria to reach
permanently higher steady state stocks, that in the case of k0 =2∗¯ ku,e x c e e db ya l m o s t7 %
the utilitarian steady state. Notice that when the initial capital stock is above the golden
rule level of capital the Rawlsian criteria converges to this point.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we proposed a new welfare criterion, called the Mixed Bentham-Rawls Crite-
rion, that we believe does justice to the rawlsian notion of intergenerational equity. We have
restricted attention to the problem of intergenerational equity, and to facilitate the analysis,
we have abstracted from intra-generational equity.
We showed that optimal growth paths under the Mixed Bentham-Rawls criterion can be
characterized using standard techniques. These paths seem intuitively plausible, and reﬂect
28both the Rawlsian concerns for the least advantaged, and the utilitarian principle. We also
obtained a characterization of the relationship between the growth rate of genuine savings
and the growth rate of utility.
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29APPENDIX
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Deﬁne the current-value Hamiltonian and Lagrangian:
H
c = θuρ +( 1− θ)u(x,c)+ψ[G(x) − c]
L
c = H
c + w[U(x,c) − u]
The optimality conditions are
∂Lc
∂c
=( 1− θ + w)uc − ψ =0 (17)
˙ ψ = ψ[ρ − G








Let us deﬁne the “eﬀective shadow price” p by
p ≡
ψ
1 − θ + w
(19)
Then equation (17) yields the optimal control c as a function of p and x:
uc(x,c)=p
At any time, if the stock level x and the eﬀectice shadow price p a r ek n o w n ,w ec a nd e t e r m i n e



















Note that ˙ ψ =0if and only if
Ux
Uc
= ρ − G
0(x)
We ask the following questions, which are particularly relevant in our mixed Bentham-Rawls
optimization problem. First, is it optimal to approach the utilitarian modiﬁed golden rule
stock level, xu, and the associated modiﬁed golden rule consumption, cu ≡ G(xu) ? Second,
can ˙ ψ>0 and yet (c,x) stay constant at a steady state which is diﬀerent from the standard
utilitarian pair (cu,xu)? We will show that if x0 > xu we should approach a steady state
xmbr > xu,a tw h i c hp o i n tw eh a v eas t a t i o n a r ye ﬀective shadow price, i.e., ˙ p =0and yet
˙ ψ>0 because of (15) and (18). In what follows, we construct a path that satisﬁes all the
necessary conditions, and then apply the suﬃciency theorem to show that it is the optimal
path.
From the deﬁnition of p
˙ p =
˙ ψ


















1 − θ + w
¶
Now we prove part (i) of the Proposition:
Suppose x0 > xu. It is feasible to approach the modiﬁed golden rule stock, xu, along
a path with monotone non-increasing consumption, and this would yield the utility level
u(xu,G(xu)) for the least advantage generations. But under the mixed Bentham-Rawls
criterion, it is not optimal to do so, because the least advantaged generations can be made
better oﬀ if the planner chooses to approach some stock level xmbr such that xu < xmbr <x g.
Their indiﬀerence curve would be to the right of the curve u(x,c)=u(xu,G(xu)).
T os e et h i sf o r m a l l y ,w en o t et h a ti fw ea p p r o a c hxu along the standard utilitarian saddle-







31So the optimal path must reach, in ﬁnite time, a steady state stock level xmbr where










but ˙ p =0as long as ˙ w satiﬁes the condition
˙ w














At the steady state ¯ xmbr
˙ ψ
ψ





























It is not possible to ﬁnd a closed form expression for xmbr because xmbr depends on the initial
stock x0.B u tw ec a ns t a t et h ec o n d i t i o n st h a tm u s tb es a t i s ﬁed.
32Starting from x0 > xu, there are two phases.
In Phase I, utility is strictly falling, and u>u,s ot h a tw(t)=0 . During this phase, the
harvest rate satisﬁes the condition
(1 − θ)uc − ψ =0
hence
c = c(x,ψ/(1 − θ))
The evolution of ψ in Phase I is described by







In Phase II, c is a constant, ˙ ψ>0 but ˙ p =0 . During this phase
˙ w
1 − θ + w














Let T denote the transition time from Phase I to Phase II. The following transversality






where w(T)=0 .T h u s ,f r o m( 2 1 ) ,a n dw(T)=0 ,w eg e t ,f o rt ≥ T
w(t)=( 1− θ)e
q(t−T) − (1 − θ)
33Substituting into (22)



















This equation requires T to be an increasing function of q and hence an increasing function
of xmbr :
T = e T(xmbr) (23)
Now consider Phase I. During this phase, w(t)=0 . We have two diﬀerential equations
˙ x = G(x) − c(x,p)







with boundary conditions, x(0) = x0, x(T)=xmbr and p(T)=uc(xmbr,G(xmbr)).T h e s e
equations yield
T = b T(x0,xmbr) (24)
where ∂ e T
∂x0 < 0 and ∂ e T
∂xmbr > 0.
T h et w oe q u a t i o n s( 2 3 )a n d( 2 4 )y i e l d
e T(xθ) − b T(x0,x θ)=0




















It remains to show that X(.) is an increasing function for all x0 >x ρ (i.e., that the denomi-




Part (ii) of the Proposition can be proved in a similar way.
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  0.25 = θ   0.5 θ = 0.75 = θ  
0 3* u x x =   0 5* u x x =  
u x   -  3000  - -  - 
u c   -  90  - -  - 
() 0 uu cc   -  4.405  - 3.270  5.541 
ru x x   -  2.667  - -  - 
ru cc   -  1.185  - -  - 
mbr u x x   1.629  1.800  2.015 1.691  1.875 
mbr u cc   1.287  1.320  1.333 1.301  1.328 
() 0 mbr u cc   3.972  3.856  3.670 3.100  5.023 
tθ   140  120.3  98.6 109.22  121.73 
Table 1. Sensitivity analysis optimal renewable resource extraction.  
Benchmark:  0.5 = θ ,  0.05 ρ = ,  0.04 r = , 12,000 K = , 0 4* u x x = . 
 
 
  0.25 = θ   0.5 θ = 0.75 = θ 0 0.25* = u x x 0 0.75* = u x x  
u x   -  3000  - -  - 
u c   -  90  - -  - 
() 0 uu cc   -  0.43  - 0.152 0.719 
ru x x   -  0.500  - 0.250 0.750 
ru cc   -  0.582  - 0.316 0.813 
mbr u x x   -  1.000  - 1.000 1.000 
mbr u cc   -  1.000  - 1.000 1.000 
() 0 mbr u cc   0.482  0.499  0.533 0.223  0.601 
tθ   10.37  17.71  29.84 17.33  20.90 
Table 2. Sensitivity analysis optimal renewable resource extraction.  














   0.25 = θ   0.5 θ =   0.75 = θ   0.01 ρ = 0.1 ρ =
0 .25* u kk =   0 .75* u kk =
u k   -  4.803  - 7.482  3.185  -  - 
u c   -  1.921  - 1.999  1.805  -  - 
u s   -  0.200  - 0.273  0.150  -  - 
() 0 uu cc   -  0.711  - 0.722  0.703  0.566  0.855 
ru kk   -  0.500  - 0.500  0.500  0.250  0.750 
ru cc   -  0.890  - 0.929  0.867  0.762  0.959 
r s   -  0.123  - 0.172  0.089  0.075  0.163 
u cc θ   0.792  0.826  0.862 0.836  0.823  0.666  0.937 
tθ   2.96  5.14  8.67 6.05  4.43 2.825  9.823 
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis optimal growth path. Benchmark:  0.5 = θ ,  0.05 ρ = ,  0.3 α = , 0 0.5* u kk = . 
 
 
  0.25 = θ   0.5 θ = 0.75 = θ  
0 1.25* u kk = 0 2* u kk =  
u k   -  4.803  - -  - 
u c   -  1.921  - -  - 
u s   -  0.200  - -  - 
() 0 uu cc   -  1.289  - 1.145  1.579 
ru kk   -  1.500  - 1.250  1.784 
ru cc   -  1.037  - 1.024  1.041 
r s   -  0.266  - 0.234  0.300 
mbr u kk   1.022  1.050  1.111 1.043  1.057 
mbr u cc   1.003  1.006  1.012 1.005  1.007 
mbr s   0.203  0.207  0.215 0.206  0.208 
() 0 mbr u cc   1.285  1.280  1.270 1.140  1.558 
tθ   20.52  15.98  11.71 13.12  18.85 
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis optimal growth path.  
Benchmark:  0.5 = θ ,  0.05 ρ = , 0.3 α = , 0 1.5* u kk = . 
 
 
 
 
 